Abstract: This paper identifies market failures that limit agricultural R&D for Africa and other resource-poor environments, and proposes a way to complement existing institutions with cash prizes for the dissemination of successful new technologies adopted by low-income farmers. The proposed prize institution would use agronomic experiments and farm surveys to document the value of innovations after their initial diffusion, and offer payments in proportion to estimated social benefits in target regions. Such prizes would be a patent-like 'pull mechanism' that pays innovators for actual results rather than proposals, adapted to reward technologies such as improved genetics and agronomic techniques.
Introduction
The flow of new technologies is widely recognised to be a fundamental determinant of economic growth, for whole economies and for agriculture in particular.
1 But the market for investments in research to develop new technologies is limited: by definition, successful research involves the disclosure of something not yet known, which makes it a difficult thing to buy.
The most widely studied factor limiting the market for research is the public-goods character of disclosure: it is non-rival, and often non-excludable. The free use of new ideas helps modern economies sustain the growth we observe, but may leave potential innovators unwilling to supply research. A more subtle constraint is the asymmetry of information between researchers and beneficiaries. To add value, researchers must know something that others do not. Potential beneficiaries may not know what they're missing from having too little research, and so be unwilling to demand more of it.
Several distinct kinds of institutions have been used to overcome the market failures associated with research activities, and thereby promote innovation and the spread of new ideas. Since antiquity, people have organised scientific academies then universities and specialised institutes to spread innovations in the public domain, and since the 15th century at least governments have offered temporary monopolies to innovators in private firms.
Despite over 500 years of tinkering with ways to reward innovation, the estimated expected return to both public and private research remains well above its costs, suggesting persistent underinvestment -and research priorities remain controversial, suggesting possible misallocation. It is difficult to determine the quality and value of research, so both public and private research institutions must divert significant resources from productive investment to oversight, administration and legal transaction costs.
Patent protection can help align researchers' incentives with market demands, but leads to market failures of its own: the exercise of monopoly rights reduces marketed supply, and asymmetric information or other problems reduce demand. These can easily generate a 'tragedy of the anti-commons', as excessively broad or long-lived patents actually reduce the development and application of new technologies. 3 To help complement public funding and patent protection, a third mechanism has recently come to public attention. A popular book (Sobel, 1995) tells the story of how, in the 18th century, a self-educated clockmaker developed newly reliable and accurate techniques, in pursuit of a cash reward offered by the British Parliament for a way to calculate longitude at sea. Later, the French government offered a prize for food preservation, which led to the discovery of how to prevent spoilage in glass bottles. In the 20th century, a series of privately-funded prizes helped advance aviation technology, including particularly the Orteig prize for the first non-stop flight from New York to Paris claimed by Charles Lindbergh in 1927, the Kremer prizes for human-powered flight claimed by a team led by Paul MacCready in 1977 and 1979. 4 Recently, Michael Kremer and colleagues (2001) have argued for research prizes to be offered for pharmaceutical research on diseases associated with poverty, such as malaria and tuberculosis. Kremer argues that high-payoff research on diseases of the poor is not being pursued in either the public or private sectors -but could be elicited by a public pre-commitment to purchase desired innovations at a price that reflects their estimated social value. Kremer argues that current institutions do not develop vaccines for malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS or other diseases because pharmaceutical research capability resides primarily in private firms, who could not earn enough revenue from market sales to recover the R&D costs of such vaccines.
The market failures that limit pharmaceutical R&D for tropical diseases are similar to those that limit research on tropical agriculture. Perhaps the most fundamental reason why private R&D may not pursue technologies suitable for adoption by low-income users is the credit constraint faced by potential adopters. If they have limited savings or collateral, they may be unable to borrow against future income to pay licence fees, even if everyone knows that adoption would be profitable. Other market failures are also more severe in low-income settings, as governments may be less willing or less able to protect intellectual property rights, or to use public funds to pay for research. For all these reasons, private R&D continues to target the medical and agricultural needs of higher-income technology users, leaving a particularly large gap between the social and private payoffs to research in low-income regions. Kremer and Zwane (2002) extended the idea of pharmaceutical-research prizes for use in the agricultural sector. As with their earlier proposal, the central idea is to offer a portfolio of prizes, promising specific awards for meeting pre-specified technical criteria. The example cited in the paper is a prize to reward the developer of blast-resistant finger millet seeds, which they estimate would be worth approximately US$92 million per year. As with Kremer's earlier prize proposals, the mechanism involves a pre-commitment to purchase the final product (in this case, seeds), rather than a one-time payment that puts the innovation into the public domain.
The prize-giving institution we propose differs from that of Kremer and Zwane in three main respects. First, our proposed institution would specify the computational procedure for determining the awards, rather than the technological characteristics of the innovations to be rewarded. Second, our proposed prizes would be one-time payments that reward innovators for benefits accruing to consumers and others, beyond what they can capture under patent protection. Finally, our proposed mechanism would be funded on a pay-as-you-go basis and governed jointly by donors and potential claimants, to limit the time-consistency and credibility problems often associated with prize schemes. These three institutional innovations are tailored to the particular challenges and opportunities of research in agriculture as opposed to other sectors, which are detailed in Section 2 below. Section 3 details the proposed institutional mechanism and explains how it would help align incentives facing researchers and funding agencies with the needs of technology users, and Section 4 is the concluding part.
The market for agricultural R&D
Although the economic payoff to agricultural R&D is well-documented, a variety of market failures severely restrict investment in it -particularly to develop technologies appropriate for very low-income farmers. Kremer and Zwane (2002) provide a clear exposition of the problem, showing in particular that while industrialised countries re-invest over 2% of agricultural GDP in research, developing countries typically invest less than one-fourth as much. The gap in levels of public agricultural R&D (Table 1) is less wide than the gap in private spending (Table 2) , if only because private agricultural R&D levels are near zero in many developing countries.
Taking account of both public and private R&D, agriculture is slightly more research-intensive than any other sectors in industrialised countries, which spent an average of 2.2% of total GDP on research in 1999 (OECD, 2003) . Agriculture's relative research-intensity cannot be explained simply in terms of political support for farmers in general, if only because funding for agricultural research does not appear to be closely correlated with other kinds of agricultural subsidies, and also because the economic returns to agricultural R&D are not lower than the returns to other kinds of research. The most plausible explanation for the relative research-intensity of agriculture is simply that farming offers relatively high returns to science-based innovation, with constant opportunities to improve the genetic potential of crops or animals as well as the purchased inputs farmers might use, given changes in farmers' economic and ecological conditions.
Developing countries as a group are catching up to industrialised countries in their agricultural R&D efforts -but rapid growth is concentrated in a few large countries, notably China and India. Sub-Saharan Africa, in contrast, has seen its share of world agricultural R&D fall, from about 8% of public R&D in 1976 to about 6% in 1995, with a sharper decline in its share of total R&D (Pardey and Beintema, 2001 ). These declines in relative R&D levels make it increasingly difficult for Sub-Saharan Africa to catch up to other regions' productivity levels. And Sub-Saharan Africa's R&D levels were quite low to begin with, at the start of the modern 'green revolution' crop-breeding effort. Africa's R&D intensity as a share of agricultural GDP was comparable to that of other low-income regions (Table 1) , but on a per-hectare basis (Figure 1 ) African agricultural research was lower than average in the early 1970s and has since remained roughly constant while other countries' R&D investment rates grew. (1999) and data from World Bank (1999). The denominator of this calculation is the sum of agricultural value added in all non-transition economies classified by the World Bank as low income. The numerator is total annual member contributions to CGIAR Source: Kremer and Zwane (2002) , who cite James (1996) and Alston, Pardey, and Roseboom (1999) . Investment differentials might be a matter of comparative advantage, if one country's research could be applied in another. But geographical spillovers are often limited (Jaffe, Manuel and Henderson, 1993) , particularly towards Africa (Johnson and Evenson, 2000) . The constraints on spillovers include not only differences in institutions, but also biophysical differences between Africa and the tropical parts of Asia or Latin America. One important biophysical barrier to agricultural technological spillovers into Africa is that the African continent is geologically older, with fewer river systems and less soil accumulation than other major regions. Two of the resulting differences between African and Asian soils are illustrated in Table 3 : a much larger fraction of Africa's agricultural area has low ability to transfer nutrients to plants (measured as cation exchange capacity, or CEC) and/or low ability to hold moisture for plants. These factors do not make agricultural R&D unproductive, but do affect the characteristics of the technologies that would be successful.
Africa's limited investment in local R&D, combined with its unusual agroecology and limited spill-in from R&D conducted elsewhere, has left it with limited stocks and flows of new technology. Part of Africa's technological lag is undoubtedly due to its government's heavy taxation of agriculture, which has inhibited farmers' willingness to invest in all sources of increased supply. Where farmers have been more heavily taxed, there has been lower agricultural productivity growth (Fulginiti and Perrin, 1999) . But much of the lag can also be explained by low R&D investment.
Some insight into the relative importance of policy incentives versus R&D effort can be identified by the characteristics of different technologies. In particular, purchased fertiliser costs a significant fraction of crop value and must be obtained from off-farm markets, whereas the marginal production cost of seeds for a new variety is little more than the cost of making seeds for an old variety, and the new variety's seeds can usually spread easily from farmer to farmer. As a result, we expect fertiliser to be more sensitive to price policies and market institutions, while new seed adoption is more sensitive to R&D effort. Africa's low plateau in fertiliser use rates is partly due to the unfavourable relative prices caused by restrictive government policies, and also by high transport costs for inbound fertiliser relative to outbound agricultural products. Another reason could be unfavourable fertiliser response rates, due to low rainfall and limited irrigation potential as well as the soil characteristics illustrated in Table 3 . But in any case, Africa's changes in fertiliser adoption rates are very different from its pattern of new variety adoption, which is illustrated in Figure 3 Figure 3 shows that Africa had almost no new variety adoption during its period of fertiliser-use growth, and has only now reached adoption rates that were seen in Asia and Latin America a generation ago. Clearly, very different factors are at work in the use of new seeds than in the use of fertiliser. Seed use may be affected by price policies and market institutions, but new seeds are relatively inexpensive and often move through non-market channels. The aggregate adoption data and abundant case study evidence, reveals that Africa's environment does not make new varieties as such unproductive: new seeds can be better than old seeds in any location. Africa's uniqueness limits spill-ins from research done elsewhere, but the economic return to agricultural R&D done within Africa is, as it is elsewhere, well above the cost of capital. The continent has been lagging behind technologically in large part because it has had relatively little R&D of a nature that is appropriate to its farmers. Analysis of the market failures that limit R&D activity can help explain this lag, and then suggest a remedy.
Market failures affecting R&D in private firms
The virtually complete absence of private R&D in the poorest countries is widely attributed to undefined or unenforced intellectual property rights. Without IPR enforcement, imitation of innovations and spillover of knowledge to other firms is likely to limit the profit any firm can draw from its investment in research. In Africa, of course, government failures run far deeper than weak IPRs: many African countries have weak rule of law in every domain, with limited legislative, judicial or police capacity to define or enforce any kind of legal construct. Recent survey data on the extent of rule of law across countries is summarised in Figure 4 below: Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido (2002) Personal rule (or the absence of rule of law) is not totally inconsistent with private investment in other areas, so it is helpful to look for other constraints that might limit private R&D in the African context. Beyond IPR enforcement, a second constraint on private R&D is asymmetric information about the value of research. In addition to the intrinsic qualities of the innovation itself, the seller may have private knowledge of its applicability or economic value. Since users cannot observe these things, they must take them on trust -so the demand for new technologies depends on the credibility of the seller. This is a classic market-for-lemons problem, which results in low or zero market activity unless a third party intervenes to reveal quality in a credible manner (Akerlof, 1970) . A third constraint on private R&D activity would be credit markets and collateral. Even when potential users know that an innovation would be profitable, they might not be able to borrow against those future earnings to finance adoption if they have inadequate savings or other assets to use as collateral. As a result, innovations that cannot easily be financed out of a household's disposable income are unlikely to be adopted.
The fourth kind of constraint involves transaction costs between IPR holders. A marketable final product may embody more than one proprietary innovation, and the bargaining process among IPR holders may be so costly that relatively few trades are made. Most notably, genetic constructs owned by foreign firms might profitably be bred into locally adapted crop varieties in numerous jurisdictions, but the high fixed costs of transaction might prevent its use in jurisdictions with a relatively small potential market.
Policy failures affecting R&D in public institutions
Given the severity and variety of market failures affecting private R&D in low-income countries, it is not surprising that significant levels of private research activity have not emerged in Africa. Public R&D faces a different but similarly severe set of constraints, which are also particularly restrictive in Africa. A first constraint on the level and orientation of public R&D is the problem of spillover across jurisdictions. Part of Africa's colonial legacy is that much of the continent has been subdivided into very many small countries, often in the order of 10-20 million people. The problem is compounded by the fact that country borders were often drawn without respect to population groupings or agroecological boundaries. Thus, the R&D performed in countries such as Bostwana will generate large benefits for the semi-arid parts of neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, as it has in the case of sorghum varieties, while Zimbabwe's population is spread over several very different agroecological zones, each of which has very different R&D needs.
A further constraint on public R&D investment arises within jurisdictions, as agricultural R&D faces particularly severe collective-action problems from rational ignorance and free-ridership. The benefits of agricultural R&D are spread over a large number of people who gain from lower food costs or higher returns to farmland and labour. If each beneficiary would gain less from increased investment than it would cost them to learn about and lobby for it, they have no individual incentive to do so. Such 'rational ignorance' (Downs, 1957 ) is likely to be a particularly severe constraint on public support for agricultural R&D in the poorest countries, where farm-income gains are spread over a majority of the population. The large size of the farm sector also facilitates free-ridership.
A more subtle constraint on public R&D activity arises from the time-consistency problem: investment in R&D is irreversible, and its productivity depends on future decisions which the current government may not control. McMillan and Masters (2003) use this problem to help explain the puzzle as to why some African governments, which have historically extracted a relatively large share of farm productivity through high taxes, did not invest more in agricultural R&D. Given their high tax rates, these governments could have recovered an unusually large fraction of the productivity gains from research -but if they could not commit to sustaining a given policy regime over time, farmers may fear future expropriation and so not respond to current incentives.
All of these constraints help explain why there is likely to continue to be relatively low effective demand or supply for agricultural research from within Africa -despite the fact that increased R&D investment would be a powerful engine of growth for the continent. Recognising this, donors have generally been willing to intervene by providing research directly. The 'invention' of the CGIAR in the 1960s was a signal event in the history of global public goods, as donors worked together to solve their collective action problems in a new way. As shown in Figure 5 , however, support waned in the 1990s, perhaps in part as a direct result of the CGIAR's success in attracting a larger number of donors (each of whom would be more tempted to free-ride on the efforts of others), targeting an increasing variety of objectives (which raises the difficulty of coordination). Figure 6 reveals an even more extreme rise and then fall in agricultural R&D support from USAID -particularly given that these data are in nominal dollars, so in real terms the decline after 1993 was even more precipitous than it appears on the graph.
The decline in donor support for R&D in Africa during the 1990s was linked to a general distrust of government institutions and a desire to provide aid directly to the private sector, as well as a belief that agriculture and agricultural technology were not central to the development process. USAID's recent reversal of this decline in 2001 may or may not represent a shift in thinking on these questions, but in any case it seems clear that some new institutional approaches would be helpful in mobilising a renewed effort to support agricultural research in Africa. 
A prize mechanism for agricultural R&D in Africa
The institution proposed in this paper aims to help remedy market failures in R&D for Africa, by aligning incentives to researchers and donors with the needs of beneficiaries. In this section, we outline the key features of the proposal, and then explain in more detail how prizes would be computed and how the mechanism would affect incentives.
Key features of the proposal

Pay for social gains, without pre-judging which technologies are needed
The proposed institution would award a fraction of the social benefits generated by an innovation, whose value would be estimated using a pre-specified protocol for field trials and farm surveys. The institution would not pre-specify the technologies to be rewarded. This proposed approach helps remedy the asymmetric information problem, allowing researchers to exploit their private knowledge or serendipitous discoveries, rewarding them only after rigorous testing proves the innovation's value. Testing would be conducted by the applicant, at their cost, as part of their R&D effort. This system would be much like the drug approval process in the USA, where the FDA specifies how applicants can document the safety and efficacy of their innovation;but in agriculture, field trials and farm surveys could go further, estimating the economic value of the new technology. A suggested protocol to measure economic value is sketched later in this section.
Make one-time payments, so innovators self-select whether to apply
The proposed prizes would be payments to innovators for the public's gains from their technology, above what the innovators can capture through product sales. Payments on the order of 10-20% of estimated social gains would be big enough to catch the attention of research managers, would be less than the share of social gains that might be captured from a marketable technology -such as the 37-44% of the benefits from Round-Up Ready soybeans estimated to have been captured by its developers (Moschini, Lapan and Sobolevsky, 2000) . Offering such prizes would reward innovations that are demonstrably valuable but are, for whatever reason, not easily marketable. Paying for public gains from technology adoption would be much like the Kremer (1998) mechanism for patent buy-outs, but in this case the amount of the prize is estimated from technological data rather than through an auction process. The proposed approach forces innovators to self-select whether they will apply for the prize, based on their private knowledge of the potential marketability of their technology. Innovators who anticipate being able to exclude free-riders and capture a significant fraction of the measurable social gains from their technology will prefer to retain private control over it, and only those who believe that their innovation is demonstrably valuable but not marketable will choose to pursue a prize.
Adjust payout rates, to equilibrate supply of funds with demand for prizes
Offering prizes is only a partial remedy for market failure. The proposed institution is a complement rather than a substitute for other forms of research funding. Establishments that are now funded through research contracts or patent revenues would see the prizes as a potential additional source of revenue, providing a marginal incentive to produce valuable but non-marketable technologies for which they currently obtain little reward. Beyond their incentive effect, the prizes would also help channel resources to talented or well-placed researchers whose successes are well-documented. By drawing a clear link between research funding and social gains, the prize mechanism could well attract much more donor interest in R&D. If so, and if this mechanism were to attract donors faster than prizes were paid out, the fraction of estimated social benefits that is to be awarded could be raised -and conversely, if the payout rate is too fast, then the proportion paid could be reduced. In any case, the prizes would be a strong complement to other support for R&D, operating as a kind of matching-funds scheme conditional on programme success, thus inducing other funding sources to spend more on R&D programmes they thought could win a prize. It is difficult to predict these effects, but some plausible magnitudes would be that prize awards are 20% of the estimated social benefits from an innovation, and that the prize mechanism is used to channel about $10 to $100 million per year, on the order of one to ten percent of all agricultural R&D in Africa.
Adjust the protocol for measuring impact, to elicit appropriate proposals
To estimate the value of an innovation, researchers will need experimental data on quantity changes, survey data on the extent of adoption, market data on relevant prices, and a method to interpret these data in terms of economic benefits. Details of a proposed approach are provided in the following section, but a first question that arises is the time horizon of benefits to be included. If the award covers only documented past benefits, then awards will be too small and innovators will wait too long before applying for an award. If the award covers all future benefits, then the estimation includes too many unverifiable conjectures. A plausible approach is to allow claims for about three years of projected future benefits. In practice, changing this time period might not much affect the size of the prizes: it would alter the size of all estimated benefits, and hence change the proportion of those benefits that could be paid in prizes.
Use an equitable governance structure, to be credible and sustainable over time
The proposed prize mechanism would be funded by donors, and governed jointly by donors and by potential claimants. This approach helps remedy the time-consistency and credibility problems often associated with prize schemes, when potential researchers do not trust that the prizes will actually be paid as promised. We propose that the prize-giving institution's staff and policies be chosen by a board composed of one-third donors to the prize fund, one-third research entities that are potential prize recipients and one-third independent members. In the donors' election, each might cast votes in proportion to their level of contribution to the prize fund. In the researchers' election, each might cast votes proportionally to their level of effort in African agricultural research, measured perhaps by the number of full-time agricultural scientists working in the field. The independent members might be required to receive a majority of votes cast in both types of election. A governing board of twelve members serving staggered four-year terms would allow each group to replace one board member every year, and a ban on receiving an award while sitting on the board would help limit self-dealing and ensure that, since institutions must rotate off the board to receive an award, incumbent board members would have a strong incentive to set time-consistent and transparent policies. The initial staff of the award authority would be small -perhaps an Executive Secretary and a few scientists, plus a budget to convene expert panels, as the USA FDA does when a particular drug-approval question requires specialist knowledge. Financial matters, both the investment of fund balances and the actual disbursement of awards, could be managed by a third party such as the World Bank.
The computation of prizes and the attribution problem
The exact procedures for computing awards would improve with experience, but a reasonable starting place is the impact-assessment methods outlined in Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) . In implementing this approach, perhaps the hardest conceptual hurdle is what Alston and Pardey (2001) call the attribution problem, which Scotchmer (1991) identifies as similar to 'double marginalisation' in industrial organisation. When calculating the marginal value of one research investment, by definition all other decisions must be taken as given, but many research investments are complements. For example, introducing a Bt variety in a given region might generate a net present value of ten million dollars. If a suitable variety were already freely available, then inserting the Bt gene into it would be worth ten million dollars. But if it is Bt genes that are freely available, then it is bringing the suitable variety that is worth ten million dollars. Scotchmer notes: 'It is impossible to give the surplus to both parties.' Asking what share of the ten million dollars should be attributed to Bt, and what share should be attributed to the underlying variety, is like asking which blade of a scissors does the cutting. In the industrial-organisation context, negotiations over the surplus can be a source of market failure. In the impact-assessment context, arguments over attribution are mainly a semantic problem, regarding the definition of which research project is being assessed.
Given the attribution problem, impact assessments of small applied research projects often show huge percentage rates of return, because many sunk costs are taken as given. The estimated rate of return falls as the costs included in the calculation expand. Both rates are correct, they just answer different questions. Similarly, adding up the net present value of the economic surplus gains attributable to various individual research projects, would yield a sum far larger than the total surplus of the sector, again because they are answers to different questions.
In the IPR context, the attribution problem is 'solved' by reviewing and possibly granting patents on a first-to-invent basis (in the US) or to the first applicant to file for it (in other countries). This leaves the holders of complementary patents to negotiate privately over their joint profits, with the familiar double-marginalisation result.
When awarding prizes, the attribution problem could be addressed in the same way as for patents, by reviewing and possibly granting awards on a first-to-invent or first-to-file basis. But with prizes, granting the award would compensate innovators for the public's gains, so no further distortion would result -by the same mechanism as the patent buy-outs proposed by Kremer (1998) .
The scope of the benefits that can be claimed by a prize applicant depends partly on what evidence is brought in the application, and partly on what other claims have already been made by others since the same benefits could not be counted twice. This is analogous to the scope of protection that can be claimed in a patent filing, which depends both on the evidence in the filing and on what has been claimed on prior patents. At the start of the process, the first applicants could make very wide claims, attempting to take credit for gains that other prize applicants might later be able to contest. It would therefore be desirable for the initial phase to involve simultaneous consideration of applications collected over an entire year or more, and perhaps also to specify a procedure for suits and appeals when additional evidence is uncovered, as is done for example in USA through the Patent Office's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.
The following elements would form the basis for a claim: a experimental data, from on-farm or market trials, to establish the physical productivity differences between the innovation and prior art b economic data, from market surveys or secondary data, to establish the relative prices of the inputs and outputs whose quantities are affected by the innovation c adoption data, from sample surveys or aerial photography or other sources, to establish the extent to which the innovation is used in a given market d model structure and parameters, inferring what is locally unobservable from economics research conducted elsewhere.
Model structure and parameters would be specified, as a matter of policy, by the prize authority. A starting point for the model and its parameters might be a partial-equilibrium model with a parallel shift of the supply curve, for which supply and demand elasticities are taken from a pre-specified set of estimates. The resulting model yields a very specific sequence of calculations, incorporating each kind of data listed above to compute the annual gross benefits and their net present value, as documented in Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) . This sequence of calculations is relatively transparent, and is no more complex than a company balance sheet. 6 To the extent that the prize authority finds this model inadequate, however, they could ask for a different set of calculations. Although some formulas are probably more accurate than others in reflecting the (unknown) 'true model' of the economy, the incentive effect of the prize system is unlikely to be much affected by the use of one model and set of parameters than another. The key factor is that awards would be proportional to the basic data described in (a), (b) and (c) above, therefore helping to align researcher institutes' objectives with the interests of farmers and other potential beneficiaries.
Conclusions
This paper provides a brief survey of the key market and policy failures that plague resource allocation for agricultural R&D, particularly in Africa, and proposes a new institution to help improve resource allocation. The proposed institution contains a number of features that make it particularly well-suited to African agriculture, where technical change usually takes the form of many incremental and location-specific innovations as opposed to a few blockbuster technologies, and where many important innovations are not marketable even with stronger IPRs.
The size of the prize fund would be expected to vary over time. On the endowment side, donors could start small, and then add funds over time if they found that the mechanism was successful in identifying and supporting the most successful research ventures. On the award-disbursement side, payouts would vary over time as the applications come in. Most likely there would be few applications at first, since it would take time for researchers to assemble the data needed to apply, so fund balance would rise and then might remain roughly constant if inflows matched outflows.
If the prize mechanism proved unattractive to donors, then inflows would slow down and payouts would gradually erode the balance until the experiment ends. If the prize mechanism proved unattractive to researchers, then the board could adjust the award formulas to increase the payout. In sum, the award authority would be a kind of marketplace through which to balance the demand and supply for research: if the approach proved attractive to both researchers and donors, then both the annual inflows and outflows would grow.
Researchers' expectations about the fund's future solvency or payout procedures, and donors' expectations about the kinds of research their money would reward, would depend entirely on the fund's performance from year to year. Unlike the Kremer (2001) vaccine-purchase fund, it would not be necessary or even desirable for the fund to accumulate a large cash balance at the outset, because the flow of agricultural research to be rewarded is not an all-or-nothing proposition. In agriculture unlike vaccine research, progress typically involves a large number of incremental improvements in specific crops and adoption domains, each of which can be rewarded separately as they are documented in applications for research awards.
The new institution, we propose, would help to complete the market for R&D, aligning the incentives facing researchers in both public institutions and private firms with the needs of potential beneficiaries. The mechanism is intended to complement rather than replace existing institutions, serving as the channel for perhaps 1-10% of total funds for agricultural R&D in Africa. Researchers in existing institutions, when offered the possibility of applying for a prize, would seize opportunities to develop valuable but non-marketable innovations -and the prize mechanism would channel resources to researchers with a proven record of success. In this way, the proposed institution would strengthen the link between donor funds and successful innovation, perhaps raising the level of support for R&D as well as improving the efficiency with which R&D funds are spent.
